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Abstract
In this paper we analyze an inter-temporal optimization problem of a repre-
sentative firm that invests in horizontal and vertical innovations and that faces a
constraint with respect to total R&D spending. We find that there can exist two
different steady-states of the economy when the amount of research spending falls
short of an endogenously determined threshold: one with higher productivities and
less new technologies being developed, and the other with more technologies being
created and lower productivities. But, for a higher amount of R&D spending the
steady-state becomes unique and the firm produces the whole spectrum of available
technologies. Thus, a lock-in effect may arise that, however, can be overcome by
raising R&D spending sufficiently.
Keywords: Multiple steady-states, lock-in, innovations, R&D constraint, optimal
control
JEL classification: C61, D92, O32
∗Department of Economics, University of Basel, Peter Merian-Weg, 6, 4002 Basel, Switzerland, e-mail:
anton.bondarev@unibas.ch
†Department of Business Administration and Economics, Bielefeld University, Universita¨tstraße 25,
33615 Bielefeld, Germany, e-mail: agreiner@wiwi.uni-bielefeld.de
Financial support from the Bundesministerium fu¨r Bildung und Forschung (BMBF) is gratefully
acknowledged (grant 01LA1105C). This research is part of the project ’Climate Policy and the Growth
Pattern of Nations (CliPoN)’. We thank an anonymous referee for comments that helped to improve the
paper.
1 Introduction
It is widely known that in the framework with co-existing vertical and horizontal innova-
tions firms tend to invest more into the development of existing products rather than into
the creation of new products. This is a typical situation in industries where large firms are
multi-product monopolists due to patent regimes, with the pharmaceutical and packaging
industries as good examples. At the same time, the technology lock-in phenomenon has
been recently shown to occur in some endogenous growth models, in which the introduc-
tion of newer technologies is postponed because they are more risky/underdeveloped, as
in the models by (Zeppini and van den Bergh 2013) and by (Acemoglu, Aghion, Bursztyn,
and Hemous 2012) for example.
In this paper we obtain the technology lock-in result for a single multi-product firm
under conditions of scarce R&D funding. This funding may reflect the research subsidy
from the government devoted to fostering new innovations or it may be determined as a
fixed fraction of the firm’s profit. It is argued that, if multiple steady-states exist in such
a setup, the appropriate way to overcome the technology lock-in lies at the microeconomic
level of firms’ constraints, rather than at the level of market regulations.
The problem of multi-product innovations has received attention in the industrial
organization literature starting with (Lambertini 2003). In that paper the optimal be-
haviour of a multi-product R&D firms is analysed. However, it is assumed that there are
no restrictions with respect to R&D spending. The motivation for this paper, therefore,
is to consider whether a constraint on R&D can lead to multiple steady-states for a single
firm. This multiplicity involves different levels of diversity of technologies as in (van den
Bergh 2008) and of their productivities. The difference to the aforementioned model is
that we allow for the expansion of the range of technologies through the creation of new
ones.
We employ the same methodology to the R&D problem as it has been done for drug
markets regulation in (Baveja, Feichtinger, Hartl, Haunschmied, and Kort 2000), where
it has been demonstrated that the multiplicity of steady-states may arise from perimeter-
type constraints on optimal dynamics. The formulation of the problem itself follows the
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setup with linear profits and cost reduction from innovations as in (Dawid, Greiner, and
Zou 2010), allowing us to neglect supply and demand effects.
Our proposed model accounts for the role of heterogeneity of new products, as in
(Hopenhayn and Mitchell 2001). The multi-product monopolist is modelled as a single
agent in the industry (market). The process of innovative activity follows the ideas of
(Romer 1990) as concerns horizontal innovations and of (Schumpeter 1942; Aghion and
Howitt 1992) with respect to vertical innovations, thus, trying to unify these approaches
in a partial equilibrium context.
The description of multi-product innovations follows the ideas of papers (Lambertini
and Orsini 2001; Lin 2004; Belyakov, Tsachev, and Veliov 2011) and more closely (Bon-
darev 2012), where the single-agent dynamic optimization problem with infinite life cycles
of technologies has been analysed. The formal analysis is based on general results of the
Maximum Principle on an endogenously defined domain of (Skritek, Stachev, and Veliov
2014).
The main contribution of the paper is the analysis of the conditions under which the
multiplicity of steady-states in the R&D investment problem may arise. We find that
one of these states corresponds to the situation of a lower range of technologies with a
high development of existing products, while the second one describes the situation with
a higher range of technologies, with all of them being less developed. This technology
lock-in may be overcome if the research spending is sufficiently increased and the two
steady-states collapse into one single steady-state. The key role as regards the existence
of such a lock-in is played by the amount of R&D spending available for the expansion
of the range of technologies and available for investments into quality improvements of
existing technologies.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the structure
of our model. Section 3 derives the optimal solution and section 4 analyzes the question
of whether the steady-state is unique or whether multiple steady-states can exist. Section
5, finally, concludes the paper.
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2 The inter-temporal optimization problem with hori-
zonal and vertical innovations
We assume a representative firm that maximizes the discounted stream of profits, given
by the productivities of all new technologies minus the cost from investments in horizon-
tal and vertical innovations, and that faces a resource constraint with respect to R&D
spending.
In the objective (1) it is assumed that the profit of the monopolist only results from
quality improvements of the technologies. This is equivalent to assuming constant prices1
and a linear profit function for all already introduced technologies (products). Then, the
only additional profit the monopolist can make is by improving the quality of the existing
technologies (products) such that they become more attractive for consumers. Linearity
of the profit function and the assumption of constant prices are standard for this type
of models, see for example (Dawid, Greiner, and Zou 2010). Thus, profits from the
introduction of new technologies (products) are proportional to their quality and prices
for them are just functions of the quality levels.
Denoting the discount rate of the firm by r > 0, the objective functional to be maxi-
mized can be written as:
J
def
= max
u(·),g(·)
∫ ∞
0
e−rt
(∫ n(t)
0
[
q(i, t)− 1
2
g(i, t)2
]
di− 1
2
u(t)2
)
dt. (1)
with:
• u(t): investments into variety expansion;
• g(i, t): investments into the productivity growth of technology i at time t;
• q(i, t): level of development (quality) of technology i at time t;
• n(t): variety of technologies already invented (introduced into the market) at time
t.
1or assuming revenue function to be linear in the state of quality with prices being linear functions of
quality
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The firm continuously develops new technologies, i ∈ I, from their potential spectrum.
The process of acquiring new technologies follows a simple linear process. At the same
time, the firm develops the productivity of all these new technologies. The dynamics for
the variety of technologies, n(t), and for the productivities of technologies, q(i, t), are
given by:
n˙(t) = ξu(t),
q˙(i, t) = ψ(i)g(i, t)− βq(i, t), ∀i ∈ [0; 1] = I ⊂ R, (2)
with:
• ξ > 0: efficiency of investments in the expansion of variety of technologies;
• ψ(i) > 0: efficiency of investments in the productivity growth of technology i;
• β > 0: rate of decay of productivity of technology i, identical across technologies.
By assuming this form of dynamics for new technologies we assume every next technol-
ogy requires more time and effort to develop and obtain then previous ones and is based
on successful innovation of preceding products. Thus it is not the case that technologies
are obtained immediately (except for the initially available stock): time to completion of
each technology i is defined from actual state of variety n and the higher is i, the more
time is required to obtain this technology.
In addition, there is a constraint on the total amount of R&D spending given by,
u(t) +
∫ n(t)
0
g(i, t)di ≤ R, (3)
stating that total R&D spending2 cannot exceed the exogenously determined value R.
The dynamic problem is then of the perimeter-type constrained one. We use the
standard technique of the augmented Hamiltonian function to obtain a characterization
of the solution, see (Fattorini 1999) for general method and (Baveja, Feichtinger, Hartl,
2the budget on R&D could be set endogenously by a specific firm’s R&D policy. It could positively
depend on total profits, but, this is difficult to model. Pure exogenous dynamics will not change the
qualitative results: the constraint is either binding or not.
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Haunschmied, and Kort 2000) for example of resource-constrained application with such
a treatment.
One also has a number of static constraints on controls and states:
q(i, t)|i=n(t) = 0, 0 ≤ n(t) ≤ n¯ ≡ 1, q(i, t) ≥ 0, u(t) ≥ 0, g(i, t) ≥ 0. (4)
From (2), (4) it can be seen, that the productivity of each technology can decline over
time (q(i, t) may decrease), but the technology itself, once invented, cannot be forgotten
(n(t) cannot decrease). The spectrum of technologies is bounded by some positive value
n¯ which is normalized to one3. In such a framework, the number of technologies grows
over time, but there is no structural change since older ones do not disappear from the
system. It should be noted that each new technology has zero productivity at the time it
is invented,
q(i, ti(0)) = 0, (5)
which makes sense from an economic point of view and where ti(0) denotes the time of
invention of the technology i4. The time of invention of the technology, ti(0), is the inverse
function of the process of variety expansion, n(t):
ti(0) = f
−1(n(t))|n(t)=i. (6)
It should be noted that the efficiency of investments, ψ(i), plays a crucial role in the
determination of the dynamics of productivities. If this is an increasing function of i,
every next technology eventually becomes more productive than all the preceding ones,
if this is a decreasing function, new technologies are harder to develop and have lower
productivity in the end. If the efficiency is the same for all technologies, ψ(i) = ψc, all
technologies evolve in the same fashion and the optimal control problem (1) subject to
(2), (4) is equivalent to a problem with two states and without a resource constraint.
3it is fairly straightforward to relax this assumption by allowing decreasing efficiency of investment
in new technologies, ξ(n) : ∂ξ(n)∂n < 0. Qualitative results of the paper will continue to hold, but the
dynamics is more elaborated. We assume a bounded state space to keep the analysis simple and clear.
4Condition (5) points to the fact that it requires efforts g(i, t) and time to develop a new technology
up to the level that it becomes productive, q(i, t) > 0.
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To make the problem interesting and manageable, we assume the following properties
with respect to the efficiency function:
• The function ψ(i) is continuous;
• It is invertible;
• It is decreasing in i.
The first two properties are necessary for the problem to have a tractable solution and
the last one is added in order to include the trade-off between staying within the existing
products range and expanding it further.5 The intuition behind this property is that
newer technologies (higher i) are more complicated and thus it is harder to develop their
productivity.
For the control problem to make sense we also require compactness of the state space
and this requires function ψ(i) to be bounded. We choose the following specific form for
this efficiency function, allowing it to vary across technologies:
ψ(i) = ψc
√
1− i, ψc > 0. (7)
Such a function permits a closed-form solution of the variety expansion problem, while
assuming that it is more complicate to raise the efficiency of new technologies than that
of older ones6. A different function that is also decreasing in i would be ψc/i. However,
we choose the specification ψc
√
1− i in order to assure the boundedness of the potential
technologies space and in order to get the closed-form solution of the model. But, the
qualitative analysis would be the same for any monotonic and decreasing function.
5For an increasing ψ(i) function there would be no trade-off between expanding the range of technolo-
gies and improving the existing ones and, thus, a lock-in could not arise.
6Since horizontal and vertical innovations are interrelated, it also leads to an increased complexity of
invention of new products.
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3 Solution of the optimization problem
To solve the dynamic optimization problem given by (1) subject to (2) and (3), we con-
struct the augmented Hamiltonian:
H =
∫ n(t)
0
[
q(i, t)− 1
2
g(i, t)2
]
di− 1
2
u(t)2 + λn(t) · (ξu(t))+
+
∫ n(t)
0
λq(i, t) · (ψ(i)g(i, t)− βq(i, t))di+ l(t) ·
(
R− u(t)−
n(t)∫
0
g(i, t)di
)
, (8)
where λn, λq are the shadow prices or co-state variables of the variety expansion and
of the productivities of technologies, respectively, and l(t) is the time-varying Lagrange
multiplier for the resource constraint.
The first order conditions for this problem are given by,
u(t) = ξλn(t)− l(t); (9)
g(i, t) = ψ(i)λq(i, t)− l(t); (10)
plus complementary slackness condition:
l(t)
R− u(t)− n(t)∫
0
g(i, t)di
 = 0, (11)
which always yields l(t) ≥ 0, since the unused budget cannot be carried over to future
periods (hence it is optimal to spend all of it unless it is not binding).
The differential equation system for the co-state variables is:
λ˙n(t) = rλn(t)− ∂H
∂n
=
= rλn(t) +
1
2
g2(n(t), t)− λq(n(t), t)ψ(n(t)) g(n(t), t) + l(t) g(n(t), t), (12)
∀i ≤ n(t) : λ˙q(i, t) = rλq(t)− ∂H
∂q
= (r + β)λq(i, t)− 1. (13)
In deriving that system, we made use of the following:
• in the first equation we make use of the condition q(i, t)|i=n(t) = 0,
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• g(n(t), t) = g(i, t)|i=n(t) is the value of investments into the productivity of the next
technology to be invented,
• λq(n(t), t) = λq(i, t)|i=n(t) is the shadow price of investments into the boundary
technology productivity,
• ψ(n(t)) = ψ(i)|i=n(t) is the value of the efficiency function at the boundary of variety
expansion at the moment t.
We can summarize our results as concerns the optimality conditions in the following
Proposition 1. The transversality conditions we employ in our problem follow the version
of the Maximum principle established in (Belyakov, Tsachev, and Veliov 2011) and more
recent (Skritek, Stachev, and Veliov 2014) for T → ∞ and current-value Hamiltonian
formulation, for details see (Seierstad and Sydsaeter 1999) for example.
Proposition 1 (Characterization of the optimality conditions)
For the inter-temporal optimization problem of the firm, given by the maximization of (1)
subject to (2) and (3), the optimal solution is characterized as follows:
1. The optimal controls for the problem are given by (9), (10) and (11);
2. The dynamics of the shadow prices for the variety expansion and for the productiv-
ities of technologies are given by (12) and by (13), respectively.
In addition, the limiting transversality conditions
lim
t→∞
e−rtλn(t) = 0, lim
t→∞
e−rtλq(i, t) = 0, ∀i ≤ n(t), (14)
must hold.
4 Uniqueness and multiplicity of steady-states
The closer analysis of the dynamic system describing the optimal R&D investment reveals
that the presence of the constraint on R&D spending leads to the possibility of multiplicity
of steady-states for this system. Before we present the analysis in detail, we first define a
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steady-state for our model and then analyze the conditions for existence and multiplicity
of these states.
Definition 1 (Steady-state)
The steady-state of the model is characterized by the following conditions:
∀i ∈ [0, 1] : q˙(i, t) = 0, λ˙q(i, t) = 0, n˙(t) = 0, λ˙n(t) = 0. (15)
Due to the form of the dynamic constraints, given by (2), the levels of productivities
of all existing technologies reach their respective steady-state values, too, as long as the
system giving the evolution of the variety is in steady-state. The steady-state levels of
productivities depend on the level of the variety at the steady-state, n˜, and on the value
of the shadow prices, λ˜n, for every given level of the research budget R, with the tilde˜
denoting steady-state values. Since λ˙n and n˙ only depend on λn and on n (see Appendix
A), the overall steady-state of the model depends on the steady-state of the dynamic
system (A.6), (A.7), given in Appendix A.
The inspection of the equation (A.6) shows that the steady-state condition for the
shadow price λn from (15) is a polynomial of second order in this variable. From funda-
mental algebra we know that such a polynomial has exactly two roots7. Thus, for every
value of n(t) there are two steady-state values of the shadow price. At the same time, the
equation (A.7) is linear in the shadow price so that there is only one steady-state of n(t)
for every value of λn. These considerations demonstrate that the system (A.6), (A.7) can
have at most two different steady-states. The isocline λ˙n = 0 generates two lines with
one origin at n ≤ 1, and the isocline n˙(t) = 0 is an initially rising concave function that
becomes vertical at n = 1. Two steady-states arise when the n˙(t) = 0 isocline intersects
the λ˙n = 0 isocline for values of n < 1 and a unique steady-state is obtained when the
isoclines intersect at n = 1.
Figure 1 illustrates the case of a unique steady-state and of two steady-states for this
system depending on the level of R. To draw Figure 1 we resorted to the parameter values
given in table 1. The research budget is set to R = 0.9 for the multiple steady-states case
7we do not distinguish between complex and real roots, since this affects only stability and not the
existence of steady states
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Table 1: Parameters values used in Figures 1 and 2.
Parameter Value
n0 0
r 0.05
ψc 0.9
ξ 0.8
β 0.1
and to R = 4 for the unique steady-state case. It should be noted that for values of R > 4,
the isocline n˙(t) = 0 shifts downward and the kink of that isocline occurs for values of
λn < 0 and not exactly at λn = 0, as it is the case for R = 4. Of course, the steady-state
is also unique for all R > 4.8
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
n
-10
-5
5
10
λn
λ˙n = 0
λ˙n = 0
n˙= 0
n˙= 0
+
+
-+-
-
(a) Unique steady-state, R = 4
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
n
-10
-5
5
10
λ˙n = 0
λ˙n = 0
λn
n˙= 0
n˙= 0
n˙= 0
+
-
-
+
+
-
(b) Multiple steady-states, R = 0.9
Figure 1: Uniqueness and multiplicity of R&D steady-states
The lower the level of the R&D budget is, the higher is the chance for a multiplicity
of steady-states where one of the steady-states corresponds to a lower level of variety
of technologies and higher shadow prices of investments than the other. That holds
8For R = 4, the lower λ˙n = 0 isocline starts at n = 1, λn = 0, the upper λ˙n = 0 isocline starts at
n = 1, λn > 0. For R > 4, the lower λ˙n = 0 isocline also starts at a value λn > 0 and n = 1.
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because a decline in R&D shifts the n˙(t) = 0 isocline upwards. The following proposition
summarizes the result.
Proposition 2 (Uniqueness and multiplicity of steady-states)
The dynamic system λ˙n, n˙, given by (A.6), (A.7), has at most two steady-states. Other
things equal the R&D budget R defines the number of steady-states of the system. With
R < R? there exist two steady-states with a low and a high level of variety of technologies.
With R ≥ R? there exists only one steady-state with n˜ = 1.
The proof of proposition 2 amounts to the calculation of the derivatives of (A.6) and
(A.7) with respect to R and taking into consideration the discussion above.
As regards the stability of the steady-states, we can make a statement for the general
model for the case of a unique steady-state, i.e. in the case of R ≥ R?. For R < R?,
however, we cannot determine stability properties for the analytical model, but only for
numerical examples. The following proposition that is proven in Appendix B summarizes
results with respect to stability.
Proposition 3 (Stability of steady-states)
In the case of a unique steady-state, i.e. for R ≥ R?, the steady-state is asymptotically
stable. In the case of two steady-states, i.e. for R < R?, numerical examples show that
the steady-state with the lower n˜ is a saddle point and the steady-state with the higher n˜
is unstable with complex conjugate eigenvalues with a positive real part.
Now, it should be noted that to each of the steady-states of the system (A.6), (A.7)
corresponds a steady-state level of productivity for each of the developed technologies
q(i)|i≤n˜. Since the research budget is limited by R, one can realize from system (2) that
this leads to a stop of the development of productivities due to increasing support costs
for each technology (given by βq(i) term).9 The steady-state level of productivity for
technology i is given by,
q˜(i) =
ψ2c (1− i)
β(r + β)
+
2
3
ψ2c
√
1− i(1− n˜)
3/2
(1 + n˜)
+ ψc
√
1− i
(1 + n˜)
(R(r + β)− 2
3
ψc − ξ(r + β)λ˜n).
(16)
9Formally, this is seen from (A.5) as follows: n˙ = 0 implies u = 0 leading to l = ξλ˜n, giving
q˙ = ψc
√
1− i
(
ψc
√
1−i
r+β − ξλ˜n
)
−βq. Since the first term is constant, q converges to its steady-state value.
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Solving n˙(t) = 0 with respect to λ and substituting the result for λ˜n in (16), q˜(i) becomes
a function of n and of other parameters. The derivative of the steady-state productivity
with respect to the variety level n is always negative:
∂q˜(i)
∂n
= −1
3
ψc
√
1− i√
1− nn2 ·
(
ψc
(
2(1−√1− n)− n(n− 1))+ (3√1− n(r + β)R)) < 0.
(17)
Thus, we have the following straightforward implication:
Corollary 1 (Productivities with multiple steady-states)
With a constraint on R&D spending giving rise to multiple steady-states for the dynamic
system λ˙n, n˙, given by (A.6), (A.7), there also exist two steady-states for the productivities
of all technologies. They are characterized by,
q˜H(i) < q˜L(i), (18)
where H (L) denotes the steady-state with the higher (lower) number of variety. At the
same time, each newer technology has a lower steady-state level:
q˜H(i+ δ) < q˜H(i), q˜L(i+ δ) < q˜L(i), δ → 0. (19)
The last result follows from the assumed form for the efficiency function, (7). Observe
that result of Eq. (18) is just a consequence of limited spending with growing mass of
technologies, but Eq. (19) is a consequence of heterogeneity and is not standard.
Corollary 1 shows that in the case of two steady-states, the one with the higher
variety of technologies implies a lower productivity of these technologies. Hence, there
is a trade-off between variety and productivity in case of two steady-states. But it must
be underlined that this trade-off only exists for a given level of R&D in the situation
of two steady-states. Thus, raising R&D may lead to a unique steady-state and to a
situation with a higher variety and a higher productivity, compared to the case with two
steady-states as our considerations below will show.
Figure 2 illustrates the difference between the average productivities of three technolo-
gies at the steady-state for the cases of a unique steady-state and for multiple steady-states
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with the parameters set to the values given in Table 1. In the case of multiple steady-
states we have taken the one with the higher productivity of technologies. It can be
realized that in the unique steady-state case each technology has a higher productivity.
That is due to the higher amount of R&D spending in the case of a unique steady-state
compared to the case of two steady-states.
(a) Unique steady-state, R = 4 (b) Multiple steady-states, R = 0.9
Figure 2: Average productivities of technologies in steady-states
Finally, we analyse the effect of changes in the R&D budget on the number of steady-
states in general and we determine the threshold level R∗. First, note that a higher R
leads to the collapse of the two steady-states into a unique one for the system (A.6), (A.7).
The unique steady-state implies n˜ = 1 and λ˜n = 0. Using this, one can easily compute
the threshold level of the research budget, R∗, from n˙(t) = 0 as:
R∗ =
2
3
ψc
r + β
. (20)
With the parameters given in table 1 one obtains R∗ = 4. It should be pointed out that the
quantity ψc/(r+β) gives the optimal investments into overall productivity growth. Thus,
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a unique steady-state can be obtained only if the research budget is at least 2/3 of optimal
investments into the growth of productivites of existing technologies. It should also be
pointed out that in the case of multiple steady-states both steady-states are inefficient in
the sense that they do not allow for the introduction of all potential technologies into the
economy, i.e. n˜ < 1 holds for both steady-states. Assuming that welfare or production
possibilities positively depend on the spectrum n, this implies that the economy is in an
inefficient situation.
Further, setting R > R? also implies a unique steady-state. However, that would
be inefficient since the same result can be obtained for R = R? because this also gives
the maximum value n˜ = 1 so that any additional R&D spending would be a waste of
resources.10 We state our result in the following proposition:
Proposition 4 (Technology lock-in with a constraint on R&D) In the R&D sec-
tor described by the dynamic system q˙, λ˙n, n˙, given by (A.5), (A.6), (A.7), the resource
constraint R is crucial as concerns the emergence of a technology lock-in.
1. For R < 2
3
ψc
r+β
, the economy is characterized by a technology lock-in with two ineffi-
cient steady-states;
2. For R ≥ 2
3
ψc
r+β
, no lock-in effect arises and the variety of technologies reaches its
maximum steady-state level n˜ = 1;
3. Optimal level of R&D expenditures are given by R? = 2
3
ψc
r+β
.
Under optimal level we understand the necessary and sufficient level of (static, exogenous)
R&D budget constraint to reach to higher steady state and avoid technology lock-in.
Increase in R would not generate faster convergence to the desired steady state since this
is exactly the level when constraint is not binding, thus relaxing it further does not make
the firm better off even before the steady state is reached.
It is important to observe that the existence of multiplicity of steady-states relies
heavily on the heterogeneity of the technological space being represented by the efficiency
10Further, there is no way to usefully spend the additional R&D on quality improvement because all
invented technologies have already reached their maximal quality levels in the steady-state.
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function ψ(i). If the efficiency of investments is the same for all the technologies, no
technology lock-in will arise. To see that just consider the underlying control problem
with ψ(i) = ψc. It follows that there will be no interplay between vertical and horizontal
innovations and thus no multiplicity of steady-states may arise.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have analyzed the inter-temporal optimization problem of a firm that
invests in R&D to generate both horizontal and vertical innovations and that faces a
constraint with respect to total R&D spending. We have found that the model may be
characterized by an uneven distribution of investments between the introduction of new
technologies and the development of older ones. With limited research expenditures it is
likely that the majority of resources will be spent on the development of existing technolo-
gies, rather than on the introduction of new ones. This will lead to the technology lock-in
phenomenon, as described in the literature, when newer technologies are underdeveloped
or even non-existent. However, due to the structure of the R&D process considered in our
model, this lock-in can be overcome by an increase in research spending above a certain
threshold that depends on the structural parameters determining the R&D process and
on the discount rate of the firm.
The technology lock-in found in our model is different from those being discussed in
the Introduction. First, it does not rely on general equilibrium effects which occur in
endogenous growth models where lock-ins have been found. Rather, the existence of the
lock-in stems from the differences between the technologies to be developed. The harder
it is to develop newer technologies in comparison to older ones, the more likely such a
lock-in would appear for a given R&D budget level. With technologies being homogeneous
in this respect, no lock-in would be observed for any budget level.
Second, in the existing literature the discussion of the lock-in phenomena boils down
to the choice of the policy to push the economy from one steady-state to the other in case
of two steady-states. In our model the logic is different. Depending on the funding level,
two or one steady-states may exist and a lock-in is described in terms of the number of
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technologies produced. In the situation with two steady-states it is not the case that one
of them is unambiguously better than the other. Rather, they are both inefficient from
the point of view of maximizing the range of technologies. The way out of this lock-in
is the transition to yet another efficient steady-state which appears as the result of a
bifurcation when both inefficient steady-states collapse into the efficient one.
Thus, the policy implication of our result is as follows. The policy maker should
subsidize R&D spending in those industries where the technologies are sufficiently different
and where each next technology is harder to develop (provided costs of subsidizing are
not exceeding the benefits). In the industries where technologies are similar to each other
concerning their investment characteristics no subsidies are necessary (even if costs of
those are low), since the only equilibrium dynamics is the optimal one. The level of this
R&D subsidy should be carefully balanced because after reaching the efficient steady-state
any additional subsidies (increases of the R&D budget) are excessive and do not generate
any additional technology. Thus, there are two crucial points for the development of
an industry-specific economic policy. First, the differentiation of products should be
measured, giving a proxy for the level of heterogeneity of technologies. Only in case such
a heterogeneity exists and new products are characterized by higher complexity, an R&D
subsidy should be considered. Second, the subsidy should be only granted if there is a
significant potential for the generation of new technologies (products).
Appendices
A Derivation of the dynamic system
In (14) we posit that the standard transversality conditions for the finite time horizon T
also holds for the infinite time horizon, with lim
t→∞
replacing lim
t→T
. For λq this implies:
∀i ≤ n(t) : lim
t→∞
e−rtλq(i, t) = 0. (A.1)
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Then, the co-state for each technology productivity can be obtained from (13) as:
∀i ≤ n(t) : λq(i, t) = 1− e
(r+β)(t−T )
(r + β)
, (A.2)
which yields a constant shadow price in time for each technology for the infinite horizon
case, i.e. for T →∞,
∀i ≤ n(t) : λq(i, t)|T→∞ = 1
(r + β)
. (A.3)
The form of l(t) results from substituting (9), (10) into (11) taking into account
specification (7) and the form of the co-state variable λq(i, t) = 1/(r + β):
l(t) =
2ψc − 2ψc(1− n(t))3/2 + 3(r + β)(ξλn(t)−R)
3 (r + β)(1 + n(t))
, (A.4)
which is a function of the variety expansion and of its co-state variable. The differential
equations for all system variables, then, are obtained by substituting the controls in
(9), (10) with l(t) defined in (A.4). The resulting productivities, q(i, t), are functions of
the variety of technologies, n(t), and of the resource constraint R which enters optimal
investments through the Lagrange multiplier:
q˙(i, t) = ψc
√
1− i
(
ψc
√
1− i
r + β
− 2ψc − 2ψc(1− n(t))
3/2 + 3(r + β)(ξλn(t)−R)
3 (r + β)(1 + n(t))
)
− βq(i, t)
(A.5)
Using the expressions for the controls, (9), (10), the Lagrange multiplier, (A.4), and
the efficiency of investments into the boundary technology, ψ(n) = ψc
√
1− n(t), one can
obtain the explicit expression for the change of the co-state variable as a function of n(t)
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and of the budget constraint R:
λ˙n(t) =
(
− β ξ
2r
(n (t) + 1)2 (r + β)2
− 1/2 r
2ξ2
(n (t) + 1)2 (r + β)2
− 1/2 β
2ξ2
(n (t) + 1)2 (r + β)2
)
·
· (λn (t))2 + r
2ξ R− 2/3ψc rξ + β2ξ R + 2 β ξ rR− 2/3ψc β ξ + 2/3ψc (1− n (t))3/2 β ξ
(n (t) + 1)2 (r + β)2
·
· λn(t) +
(
ψc
√
1− n (t)β ξ + ψc
√
1− n (t)rξ
(r + β)2 (n (t) + 1)
+ r + 2/3
ψc (1− n (t))3/2 rξ
(n (t) + 1)2 (r + β)2
)
λn (t)−
− 7/6 ψc
2 (n (t))2
(n (t) + 1)2 (r + β)2
− 5
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ψc
2 (n (t))3
(n (t) + 1)2 (r + β)2
− 2/3 ψc (1− n (t))
3/2 β R
(n (t) + 1)2 (r + β)2
−
− 2/3 ψc (1− n (t))
3/2 rR
(n (t) + 1)2 (r + β)2
+ 1/3
ψc
2 (n (t))2
(r + β)2 (n (t) + 1)
+ 2/3
ψc
2
√
1− n (t)
(r + β)2 (n (t) + 1)
−
− 1/2 R
2β2
(n (t) + 1)2 (r + β)2
− ψc
√
1− n (t)β R
(r + β)2 (n (t) + 1)
− ψc
√
1− n (t)rR
(r + β)2 (n (t) + 1)
+
+ 2/3
ψcRr
(n (t) + 1)2 (r + β)2
− R
2β r
(n (t) + 1)2 (r + β)2
− 1/2 R
2r2
(n (t) + 1)2 (r + β)2
+
+ 7/6
ψc
2n (t)
(n (t) + 1)2 (r + β)2
− 5/3 ψc
2
(r + β)2 (n (t) + 1)
+ 4/9
ψc
2 (1− n (t))3/2
(n (t) + 1)2 (r + β)2
+
+ 4/3
ψc
2n (t)
(r + β)2 (n (t) + 1)
+ 2/3
ψcRβ
(n (t) + 1)2 (r + β)2
+ 1/18
ψc
2
(n (t) + 1)2 (r + β)2
(A.6)
Substitution of (9) with l(t), given by (A.4), into the dynamics of variety expansion from
(2), yields the following differential equation for n(t):
n˙(t) = ξ2λn(t)
n(t)
1 + n(t)
− ξ
(
2ψc − 2ψc(1− n(t)3/2 − 3R(r + β)
)
3 (r + β)(1 + n(t))
(A.7)
B Proof of proposition 3
To prove the first part, we first note that the inital value of n, n(0) = n0 < 1, is given
whereas the initial value for λ, λ(0), can be chosen freely by the optimizing firm. Then,
we see from figure 1(a) that starting above the lower λ˙n = 0 isocline implies that n(t)
rises and λ(t) rises (declines) if the initial λ(0) is chosen below (above) the upper λ˙n = 0
isocline. Since n(t) cannot decline, limit cycles are excluded. Therefore, and since this is a
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two dimensional system in the plane, the only feasible solution in that case is convergence
to the steady-state (n˜ = 1, λ˜n > 0).
In the case of two steady-states, the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix evaluated at
the steady-state are symmetric around r/2. For the parameter values in table 1, the
steady-state with the lower n˜ is a saddle point, with the eigenvalues given by 0.9424 and
−0.8924 and the steady-state with the higher n˜ is an unstable focus, with the eigenvalues
given by 0.025 ± 1.02576 i, where i = √−1. The same qualitative result is obtained
for R = 0.1 and all other parameter values unchanged. Qualitatively, the result also
remains unchanged when setting r = 0.05, ψc = 1, ξ = 1, β = 0.1, R = 0.9 and for
r = 0.02, ψc = 1, ξ = 1, β = 0.1, R = 2.5.
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